Abstract We consider three mechanisms for the aggregation of information in het- 
Each juror receives a single private signal prior to the vote. A signal s ∈ {i, g} 129 indicates either guilt or innocence. A signal is "correct" with probability p ∈ . 1 , 1 . ,
130
i.e. P(s = g|G) = P(s = i | I ) = p, while P(s = i |G) = P(s = g| I ) = 1 − p.
131
Juror signals are i.i.d. Let |g| denote the total number of g-signals received by the jury.
132
The conditional probability P (G| |g| = k) that the defendant is guilty given |g| = k 133 in an n persons jury is given as follows:
B( p, k, n) B( p, k, n) + B(1 − p, k, n)
, where B( p, k, n):= . n .
(1)
136
For j ∈ {1 ,..., n} , each jury member j 's preferences, are determined by a com-137 monly known parameter q j ∈ (0, 1) . A juror's payoff function is given as follows:
138 Define Uj (C | I ) = −q j as the utility obtained by juror j when the defendant is con-139 victed despite being innocent, and Uj ( A|G) = −(1 − q j ) as the utility obtained when 140 the defendant is acquitted but guilty. The utility related to remaining combinations of 141 state and action (acquittal of an innocent or conviction of a guilty) is normalized to 142 0. Suppose a mechanism M yielding a probability P(C | I ) of convicting an innocent 143 defendant and a probability P( A|G) of acquitting a guilty defendant. The expected 144 utility of juror j under mechanism M is given as follows:
145 Uj (M ) := − q j P(C | I )P(I ) − (1 − q j )P( A|G)P(G).
146
Given this utility function, a juror j prefers conviction to acquittal whenever his 147 posterior probability that the defendant is guilty exceeds q j . The parameter q j thus ˜ j j .
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148
measures the juror's degree of aversion to wrongful conviction. The higher q j , the 149 more evidence of guilt is required for juror j to prefer conviction.
150
Juror preferences are heterogeneous and fall into two homogeneous categories. The 151 jury contains n D doves (D) with preferences qD and n H hawks (H ) with preferences 152 qH , where qH < qD and n D + n H = n. We assume that at least one of the two 153 preference types is present at least twice in the committee. We refer to the allocation of 154 committee seats among preference types as the jury composition. For each j ∈ {H, D}, 155 we use the notation − j = {H, D}\ j . For a given type j ∈ {H, D} and total number of 156 n, the conviction threshold T n is an integer number that satisfies the following:
n j
We make the following assumptions about preferences. First,
159
A.1: T n − T n :=m ≥ 2.
D H
160
In other words, in a putative equilibrium in which all n signals would be publicly 161 revealed before the vote, at least two signal profiles would cause disagreement between This implies that a dove favours conviction only if the probability that the defendant 170 is guilty exceeds 1 . This requirement matches the jury setting, where the "voir dire"
171 selection process eliminates jurors that are excessively prone to convict. The assump-172 tion is used in proving our welfare results and we do not claim that it is necessary.
173
Throughout this paper, we examine games exhibiting the following timing. profile is characterized by a vector of mixing probabilities
, where
s denotes the probability that a single juror of type j votes for conviction given a 212 signal s ∈ {i, g}. Let pi v j denote the event in which a given juror of preference type j 213 is pivotal in the sense that the final decision changes with the juror's vote. Let γ j and
214
I denote the likelihood that a juror of preference type j votes for conviction given 215 respectively state G or I . We have
Define furthermore the indicator function Y ( j, k) as follows. For j, k ∈ {H, D},
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We call symmetric and monotonous no deliberation strategy profiles simple ND 
stitutes an equilibrium iff, ∀ j ∈ {H, D} , ∀s ∈ {i, g}: 
271
273
Proof The double inequality (7) 
315
We comment on key restrictions here. Given perfectly identical Subgroup prefer- set. This implies that given a strategy of type − j featuring truthtelling followed by
322
(possibly mixed) voting, the mixed voting strategy of type j is summarized by a vector 323 (t j ,θ j ), as in the case of mixed voting under PD described above. In order to char-324 acterize the set of equilibria featuring truthtelling followed by possibly mixed voting, 325 one would thus have to identify an equilibrium vector given by (tH , θH , tD , θD ). This 326 task is substantially more complicated than identifying a pair (tH , tD ) (equivalent to 327 (tH , 1, tD , 1)) as we do. Furthermore, the increased complexity would carry over to the Subgroups are large, randomization in voting by a given preference type will thus only 335 occur rarely in any given equilibrium and is thus arguably unlikely to heavily affect 336 the type of implementable decision rules.
337
We now characterize conditions under which a given reactive SSD profile consti-338 tutes an equilibrium. Let |g| j stand for the number of guilty signals held by Subgroup where t j ∈ . 1, . . . , n j . ∀ j ∈ {H, D} , constitutes an equilibrium iff: 
348
Proof See in Appendix 1.
349
Under the SD protocol, a type 1 or type 2 reactive SSD profile that constitutes an 350 equilibrium is called respectively a type 1 or type 2 reactive SSDE.
351
The idea behind reactive SSDEs is that each homogeneous Subgroup j votes as 
Proof See in Appendix 2.
370
The unique reactive SNDE, under our restrictions, is thus one in which hawks 371 always convict, while doves vote as if they were an independent committee voting 372 privately under Unanimity. The voting behavior of doves replicates the equilibrium 373 characterized in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998 . . 
468
Before going on to the final step of our normative analysis, which provides a com- captured by respectively cases a) and b).
508
In case a), given that qH ≤ P . 
514
We now expand on case b). The condition that qH > P .
.
means that the hawks' information is decision relevant in the sense that conditional on
516
, hawks favour an acquittal. Clearly, conditional on the infor-517 mation set . relies on the fact that the identified reactive SPDE and SSDE allow for a superior aggregation of the information held by doves, in a way that is also beneficial to hawks.
586
Second, to the extent that one focuses on a restricted class of equilibria under PD, 587 SD furthermore dominates PD. This second result relies on the fact that the identified 588 class of reactive SSDEs allows to also aggregate the information held by hawks.
589
Our analysis features a number of restrictions that future research should address.
590
A truly robust comparison of PD and SD would need to characterize the whole set 591 of reactive equilibria under each of the protocols, thus abandonning the restriction 592 to monotonous, symmetric and pure strategies. It may be that PD and SD cannot be 593 ranked in the Pareto sense. One also ought to consider other voting rules than Una-594 nimity. In the case of SD and non unanimous voting rules, we conjecture that welfare 595 dominant equilibria involve members of the same Subgroup voting asymmetrically.
596
In such equilibria, the number of Subgroup members voting C would increase as a 597 function of the number of g-signals held by the Subgroup. Another restriction of our 598 analysis is the unrealistic assumption of only two preference types. Enlarging the set 599 of preference types would however substantially complicate the analysis. One first 600 direction to explore would be to assume that any juror's preference type is located 601 within a neighbourhood of either of two reference values qH or qD . Finally, the binary 602 information structure that we assume is restrictive. Our comparison of simple proto-603 cols ought to be repeated in a setting featuring continuous signals in order to evaluate 604 whether our results still hold in such a more natural and versatile environment.
605
Appendix 1
606
Lemma 2
607
Step 1 In a reactive SSDE, two types of individual deviations must be prevented. 608 The first type involves a deviation at the voting stage following a truthful announce-609 ment at the communication stage. The second type of deviation involves lying at the 610 communication stage. 611 Step 2 We here prove Point a), corresponding to the set of type 2 reactive SSDEs. We 612 first show that the condition given in Point a) is sufficient to ensure that none of the 613 above mentioned two types of deviations is strictly advantageous to a juror of type 614 j . Assume thus that the condition of Point a) is satisfied. Regarding the first type of 615 mentioned deviation, the threshold adopted by each Subgroup is ex post optimal at the 616 voting stage, conditional on the locally pooled information and assuming individual 617 pivotality, i.e. assuming that that the other Subgroup votes for conviction. We now 618 examine the second type of deviation. Note that misreporting a g-signal as an i -signal 619 is either inconsequential or adversely triggers an acquittal given a Subgroup signal 620 profile where the deviating juror would have favoured a conviction. This can thus not 621 be strictly advantageous to a juror. Instead, misreporting an i -signal as a g-signal 622 is always without consequence on the final decision, as a juror can alway block a 623 conviction triggered by his lie if he realizes that he favours acquittal, given remaining
624
Subgroup members' signals.
625
We now show that the condition stated in Point a) is necessary to ensure that none 626 of the two types of deviations mentioned in step 1 is strictly advantageous to a juror an i -signal as a g-signal is either inconsequential or adversely triggers a conviction
given a signal profile where the deviating juror would have favoured an acquittal. This 672 can thus not be strictly advantageous to a juror. 673 We now show that the condition given in Point a) is necessary to ensure that none 674 of the two types of deviations mentioned in step 1 is strictly advantageous. Suppose 675 thus that the condition is not satisfied. Suppose that t j is larger than specified by 676 the condition, given t− j . Then a juror of preference type j has a strict incentive to 677 announce an i -signal as a g-signal and subsequently vote on the basis of the known 678 signal profile of his Subgroup and the assumption that the other Subgroup convicts. 679 Suppose that instead t j is smaller than specified by the condition, given t− j . Then a 680 juror of preference type j has a strict incentive to announce a g-signal as an i -signal 681 and subsequently vote on the basis of the known signal profile of his Subgroup and 682 the assumption that the other Subgroup convicts. 683 Step 6 We now examine the set of type 1 reactive SSDEs. The analysis of (9) for type 684 j follows the exact same steps as the analysis of type 2 reactive SSDEs. The analysis 685 of (10), corresponding to type − j , is identical to that given in step 3 and thus not 686 repeated.
687
A further lemma on reactive SSDEs
688
The following lemma states in close form the existence conditions for a type 2 reactive 689 SSDE.
690
Lemma 10 SSDEs.
691
(tH , tD ) constitutes a type 2 reactive SSDE iff, ∀ j ∈ {H, D} , it holds that t j ∈ 692 .
1, . . . , n j . and
. .
1− p
697
Proof Note that (tH , tD ) constitutes a type 2 reactive SSDE iff, ∀ j ∈ {H, D} , it 698 holds that t j ∈ . 1, . . . , n j . and the following two inequalities simultaneously hold: 
704
Now, note that (15) can be rewritten as follows:
Applying the ln-transformation to both sides of (17), the above inequality can then 708 be rewritten as follows: Table 1 below. Letters x , y ∈ (0, 1) are used to denote mixing probabilities.
1 Table 1 .
We show that none of the above nine strategy profiles constitutes an equilibrium. 720 Equilibrium 1 trivially never exists when m > 1. Equilibria 2,4 and 6 do not exist under 721 the assumption that qD < β ( p, n, n) given that they require either qD = β ( p, n, n) 722 or qH = β ( p, n, n) (recall qH < qD ). Recall in what follows that pi v j stands for the 723 event in which a juror of preference type j is pivotal, i.e. all remaining jurors vote for 724 conviction. Equilibria 3,7 and 9 imply (19) and (20), as given below. . 
. (1 p) 
745
The inequality relation (23) however means that m ≤ 1 if equilibrium 3,7 or 9 exist. 746 But we have assumed m > 1. As to equilibria 5 and 8, note that they imply that the 747 following two conditions (24) and (25) hold:
The inequalities (24) and (25) imply that there exists a positive integer T s.t.:
759
Now, note that (26) means that m ≤ 1 if equilibrium 5 or 8 exists. But we have 760 assumed m > 1. To summarize Step 1, we have now shown that none of the nine 761 possible reactive SND voting profiles in which both types condition their play on their 762 information (as listed in Table 1 ) ever constitutes an equilibrium. 763 Step 2 The next steps examine the set of putative reactive SNDEs in which at least one of 764 the two preference types plays (σg = 1, σi = 1) while the other type conditions its play 765 on its information. Here, altogether six profiles need to be considered, depending on 766 the nature of the strategy, (σg = 1, σi = 0) or (σg = 1, σi = x ) or (σg = y, σi = 0), 767 0 < x , y < 1, played by the preference type that conditions its play on its signal g i
773
Step 3 We here examine strategy profiles in which the hawks condition their play on 774 their signal while the doves play (σ D = 1,σ D = 1). In such an equilibrium it must g i 775 be the case that:
778
Now, note however that:
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783
(1 − p)
Now, (29) and (30) imply that there exists a positive integer T s.t.:
791
This in turn means that m ≤ 1. We have however assumed m > 1. Therefore this 792 type of equilibria does not exist.
793
Step 4 We now examine equilibria in which the doves condition play on their signals 794 while the hawks play (σ H = 1,σ H = 1) . There are a priori three such candidates.
The first candidate is the equilibrium given by 
equilibrium B, note that y satisfies: ( 1−qD )(1− p)
811 It follows that equilibrium B exists iff 1 − p < qD <β ( p, n D − 1, n D ).
812
Lemma 5: reactive SPDEs Clearly, using together conditions (34) and (35), there always exists some reac-832 tive SSDE given our assumptions on qH and qD . 
837
Note that there may exist multiple reactive SSDEs. We prove this by an example. 838 Suppose n H = 6, n D = 8, qH = 0.7, qD = 0.9 and p = 0.83. For these parameters, 839 it is readily checked that there exist two type 2 reactive SSDEs given by respectively 840 (tH = 3, tD = 4) and (tH = 2, tD = 5).
841
Point b) Using the conditions given in Lemma 7 in Appendix 1, call t BR (t j ) the 842 unique best response threshold of Subgroup i to the threshold t j of Subgroup j, as 843 defined in (13). Note that either t BR (t j + 1) = t BR (t j ) or t BR (t j + 1) = t BR (t j ) − 1.
844 Suppose that (k, l) constitutes a reactive SSDE. Given the behavior of t BR (tH ), only 845 the four following threshold profiles may also constitute reactive SSDEs: (k −1, l +1) , 846 (k −1, l), (k +1, l) or to (k +1, l −1). Furthermore, given the behavior of t BR (tD ), only 847 the four following threshold profiles may also constitute reactive SSDEs: (k −1, l +1), 848 (k, l + 1), (k, l − 1) or (k + 1, l − 1). Taking the intersection of the two sets, the only 849 neighbouring points to (k, l) that may constitute reactive SSDEs are (k − 1, l + 1) or 850 (k + 1, l − 1). Suppose finally that the two best response functions do not intersect in
851
any of these two neighbouring points. Then, this implies that they do not intersect in 852 any other point than (k, l).
853
Appendix 3
854
Proposition 1: reactive SPDE vs reactive SNDE
855
Step 1 Recall that the unique reactive SPDE involves doves truthfully revealing their 856 signal and voting according to T n D while hawks babble and always convict.
857
Step 2 Recall that there always exists a unique reactive SNDE, given by profile A or B. reactive SPDE are thus outcome equivalent.
862
Step 3 Steps 3 to 9 are dedicated to the examination or parameter values for which 863 profile B is the unique reactive SNDE (i.e. iff 1 − p < qD < β ( p, n D − 1, n D )).
864
Recall that the latter equilibrium is given by The transition from the unique reactive SNDE to the unique SPDE 867 is clearly strictly beneficial to the doves, as these are now optimally aggregating their 868 information. In contrast, it however remains unclear whether the transition from the 869 first to the second equilibrium is strictly beneficial to the hawks as well. If we can 870 prove that this is the case, then we know that the unique reactive SPDE is strongly 871 Pareto improving w.r.t to the unique reactive SNDE, for the concerned parameter 872 values.
873
Step 3 All we need is thus to show that, starting from the reactive SND profile B, 
